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1.0 Introduction
Under the terms of Alfred Nobel’s will, the Prizes were to be awarded for an
“important discovery or invention.”Let it be clear from the outset, there-
fore, that my case must be one of the former, not the latter. Contrary to
what you may have read in some press accounts following the announce-
ment of the 1990 Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences, I am not the co-
inventor of the leveraged buyout - the transaction that perhaps more than
any other has come to symbolize the supposed financial excesses of the
1980’s. Leveraged buyouts (LBO’s), in which the younger, active managers
of a firm borrowed the funds to buy the controlling shares from a firm’s
retired founder (or from his estate) were an established feature of the
corporate landscape long before Franco Modigliani, the 1985 laureate, and
I published our first joint paper on leverage and the cost of capital in 1958.
The LBO’s of the 1980’s differed only in scale, in that they involved
publicly-held rather than privately-held corporations and in that the take-
overs were often hostile.
That Franco Modigliani and I should be credited with inventing these
takeovers is doubly ironic since the central message of our M&M Proposi-
tions was that the value of the firm was independent of its capital structure.
Subject to one important qualification to be duly noted below, you couldn’t
hope to enhance shareholder value merely by leveraging up. Investors
would not pay a premium for corporate leverage because they could always
leverage up their own holdings by borrowing on personal account. Despite
this seemingly clear prediction of the M&M analysis, the LBO’s of the
1980’s were routinely reporting premiums to the shareholders of more than
40 percent, running in some cases as high as 100 percent and all this mind
you, even after the huge fees the deal-making investment bankers were
extracting.
The qualification to the M&M value-invariance proposion mentioned
earlier concerns the deductibility of interest payments under the uninte-
grated U.S. corporate income tax. That deductibility can lead, as we showed
in our 1963 article, to substantial gains from leveraging under some condi-
tions, and gains of this tax-driven kind have undoubtedly figured both in the
rise of corporate debt ratios generally in the 1980’s and in some recent
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offsetting tax costs of leveraged capital structures (such as those discussed
in my paper “Debt and Taxes” (1977) and its follow-up literature), tax
savings alone cannot plausibly account for the observed LB0 premiums.
1.1 Leveraged buyouts: where the gains came from
The source of the major gains in value achieved in the LBO’s of the 1980’s
lies, in fact, not in our newly-recognized field of finance at all, but in that
older, and long-established field of economics, industrial organization.
Perhaps industrial reorganization might be an apter term. Mikhail Gorba-
chev, the 1990 Peace Prize Winner, may have popularized the term pere-
stroika, but the LBO entrepreneurs of the 1980’s actually did it, and on a
scale not seen since the early years of this century when so much of what we
think of as big business was being put together by the entrepreneurs of
consolidation like J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller.
That the LBO entrepreneurs have achieved substantial real efficiency
gains by reconcentrating corporate control and redeploying assets has been
amply documented in a multitude of academic research studies. (See Ka-
plan, 1989). But this basically positive view of LBO’s and takeovers is still far
from universally accepted among the wider public. Some are reacting to the
layoffs and factory closings that have sometimes followed hostile takeovers,
although far more of both have occurred in our automobile industry which
has so far been immune from takeovers. Others worry that these short-run
gains may represent merely the improvident sacrifice of opportunities for
high, but long deferred future profits - an argument presuming among
other things, that the market cannot properly compute discounted present
values. Even more fear that the real efficiency gains, if any, will be more
than offset by the collateral damage from the financial leveraging used to
bring about the restructuring.
1.2 The problems of corporate leveraging: real or imagined?
These fears will be the main focus of this lecture. The statutes of the Nobel
Foundation stipulate that the subject of the Nobel Lecture “should be on or
associated with the work for which the prize was awarded,” which, in my
case means the M&M propositions. Rather than simply reviewing them,
however, or discussing the subsequent research they have inspired (a task
already undertaken in Miller (1988)) I propose here instead to show how
those propositions bear on current concerns about overleveraging - con-
cerns that in some quarters actually border on hysteria. In particular I will
argue, first, that the highly visible losses and defaults on junk bonds do not
mean that overleveraging did in fact occur; second, paradoxical as it may
sound, that increased leveraging by corporations does not imply increased
risk for the economy as a whole; third, that the financial distress being
suffered by some highly leveraged firms involves mainly private, not social
costs; and finally, that the capital markets have built-in controls against
overleveraging - controls, moreover, very much in evidence at the mo-
ment. Recent efforts by our regulators to override these built-in marketM. H. Miller 293
mechanisms by destroying the junk bond market and by imposing additional
direct controls over leveraged lending by banks will thus have all the
unintended consequences normally associated with such regulatory inter-
ventions. They will lower efficiency and raise costs (in this case, the cost of
capital) to important sectors of our economy.
That the current emphasis on the evils of overleveraging may be mis-
placed does not mean, of course, that all is well. My message is not: “Relax.
Be happy. And, don’t worry.” Worry we should, in the U.S. at least, but
about the serious problems confronting us, such as our seeming inability to
bring government spending under rational control or to halt the steady
deterioration of our once-vaunted system of public education. Let us not
waste our limited worrying capacity on second-order and largely self-cor-
recting problems like financial leveraging.
I hope I will be pardoned for dwelling in what follows almost exclusively
on U.S. examples. It’s just that a particularly virulent strain of the anti-
leverage hysteria seems to have struck us first. Perhaps others can learn
from our mistakes.
2.0 The Private and Social Costs of Corporate Leveraging
The charge that the U.S. became overleveraged in the 1980’s will strike
some as perhaps too obvious to require any extensive documentation. What
could offer more compelling evidence of the overissuance of debt than the
defaults of so many junk-bond issuers in late 1989, with news of additional
or pending defaults now almost a daily occurrence?
2.1 The junk bonds as just another risky security
To argue in this all too natural way, however, is to put too much emphasis
on the word “bond” and not enough on the word ‘junk”. Bonds are,
indeed, promises to pay. And certainly the issuers of the bonds hoped to
keep those promises. But if the firm’s cash flow, for reasons competitive or
cyclical, fails to cover the commitments, then the promises cannot be kept,
or at least not kept in full.
The buyers of the junk bonds, of course, also hoped that the promises
would be kept. But they clearly weren’t counting on it! For all save the most
hopelessly gullible, the yields expected (in the Markowitz sense of yield
outcomes weighted by probability of occurrence) on junk bonds, were
below the nominal or promised yields. The high promised yields that might
be earned during the good years were understood as compensation for the
possible bad years in time and bad bonds in the total junk bond portfolio.
The high nominal yields, in short, were essentially risk premiums. And in
1989, for many of the junk bonds issued earlier, the risk happened.
Although the presumption in finance is that defaults represent bad
outcomes ex post, rather than systematic misperception of the true ex ante
odds, as seems to be the conventional view, that presumption cannot yet be
established conclusively. The time series of rates of return on junk bonds is
still too short for judging whether those returns are indeed anomalously too294 Economic Sciences 1990
low (or perhaps even anomalously too high) relative to accepted asset-
pricing models like those of my co-laureate William Sharpe and his succes-
sors. Few such anomalous asset classes have so far been identified; and
nothing in the nature of high-yield bonds strongly suggests that they will
wind up on that short list.
Some may question the fairness of my treating these realized risks on junk
bonds as essentially exogenous shocks, like earthquakes or droughts. Surely,
they would contend, the very rise of corporate leverage that the junk bonds
represent must itself have increased the total risk in the economy. On that
point, however, modern finance in general and the M&M proposition in
particular offer a different and in many respects, a counter-intuitive per-
spective.
2.2 Does increased corporate leverage add to society’s risk?
Imagine that you, as a venerable academic professor of finance are in a
dialogue with an equally grizzled corporate treasurer who believes, as most
of them probably do, that leveraging does increase total risk. “You will
surely concede, Professor,” he is likely to begin, “that leveraging up the
corporate capital structure will make the remaining equity riskier. Right?”
“Right,” you say. A company with a debt/equity ratio of 1, for example,
earning a 20 percent rate of return on its underlying assets and paying 10
percent on its bonds, which, of course, have the first claim on the firm’s
earnings, will generate an enhanced 30 percent rate of return for its equity
holders. Should the earning rate on the underlying assets decline by 25
percent, however, to 15 percent, the rate of return on equity will fall by an
even greater extent (33 l/3 percent in this case). That, after all, is why we
use the graphic term leverage (or the equally descriptive term gearing that
the British seem to prefer). And this greater variability of prospective rates
of return to leveraged shareholders means greater risk, in precisely the
sense used by my colleagues here, Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe.
That conceded, the corporate treasurer goes on to ask rhetorically: “And,
Professor, any debt added to the capital structure must, necessarily, be
riskier debt, carrying a lower rating and bearing a higher interest rate than
on any debt outstanding before the higher leveraging. Right?” “Right,” you
again agree, and for exactly the same reason as before. The further a
claimant stands from the head of the line at payoff time, the riskier the
claim.
Now the treasurer moves in for the kill. “Leveraging raises the risk of the
equity and also raises the risk of the debt. It must, therefore, raise the total
risk. Right?” “Wrong,” you say, preparing to play the M&M card. The
M&M propositions are the finance equivalents of conservation laws. What
gets conserved in this case is the risk of the earning stream generated by the
firm’s operating assets. Leveraging or deleveraging the firm’s capital struc-
ture serves merely to partition that risk among the firm’s security holders.’
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To see where the risk goes, consider the following illustrative example.
Suppose a firm has 10 security holders of whom 5 hold the firm’s bonds and
the remaining 5 hold equal shares in the firm’s leveraged equity. Suppose
further that the interest due on the 5 bonds is covered sufficiently for those
bonds to be considered essentially riskless. The entire risk of the firm must
thus be borne by the 5 shareholders who will, of course, expect a rate of
return on their investment substantially higher than on the assumed riskless
bonds. Let 2 of the common stockholders now come to feel that their share
of the risks is higher than they want to bear. They ask to exchange their
stockholdings for bonds, but they learn that the interest payments on the 2
additional bonds they will get in exchange could not be covered in all
possible states of the world. To avoid diluting the claims of the old bond-
holders, the new bonds must be made junior to the old bonds. Because the
new bonds are riskier, the 2 new bondholders will expect a rate of return
higher than on the old riskless bonds, but a rate still less, of course, than on
their original, and even higher-risk holdings of common stock. The average
risk and the average expected interest rate of the 7 bondholders taken
together has thus risen. At the same time, the risk assumed by the remaining
3 equity holders is also higher (since the 2 shifting stockholders now have
taken a prior claim on the firm’s earnings) and their expected return must
rise as well. Both classes of securities are thus riskier on average, but the
total risk stays exactly the same as before the 2 stockholders shifted over.
The increased risk to the 3 remaining stockholders is exactly offset by
decreased risk to the 2 former stockholders who have moved down the
priority ladder to become junior bondholders.2
2.3 Leverage and the deadweight costs of financial distress
That aggregate risk might be unaffected by modest changes of leverage
some might willingly concede, but not when leverage is pushed to the point
that bankruptcy becomes a real possibility. The higher the leverage, the
greater the likelihood, of course, that just such an unfortunate event will
occur.
Actually, however, the M&M conservation of risk continues to hold,
subject to some qualifications to be duly noted below, even in the extreme
case of default. That result seems paradoxical only because the emotional
and psychological overtones of the word bankruptcy give that particular
outcome more prominence than it merits on strictly economic grounds.
independent of the financing decisions. Subsequent research has identified many possible
interactions between the real and the financial sides of the firm, but their effects on risk are not
always in the same direction and for present purposes, they can be regarded as of only second-
order importance.
2 Nor, incidentally, that this story would have exactly the same conclusion if the 2 defecting
common stockholders had opted for preferred stocks rather than junior bonds. Even though
accountants classify preferred stocks as equity, preferreds are functionally equivalent to junior
debt. Preferred stocks, in fact, were effectively the junk bonds of finance (often with the same
bad press) prior to the 1930’s when the steep rise in corporate tax rates made them less
attractive than tax-deductible, interest-bearing securities of equivalent priority.296 Economic Sciences 1990
From a bloodless finance perspective, a default signifies merely that the
stockholders have now lost their entire stake in the firm. Their option, so to
speak, has expired worthless. The creditors now become the new stock-
holders and the return on their original debt claims becomes whatever of
value is left in the firm.
The qualification to the principle of risk conservation noted earlier is that
the very process of transferring claims from the debtors to the creditors can
itself create risks and deadweight costs over and beyond those involved
when the firm was a going concern. Some of these “costs of financial
distress,” as they have come to be called, may be incurred even before a
default occurs. Debtors, like some poets, do not “go gentle into that good
night.” They struggle to keep their firms alive, even if sometimes the firm
would be better off dead by any rational calculation. They are often assisted
in those efforts at life-support by a bankruptcy code that materially
strengthens their hands in negotiations with the creditors. Sometimes, of
course, the reverse can happen and over-rapacious creditors can force
liquidation of firms that might otherwise have survived. About all we can
safely conclude is that once the case is in bankruptcy court, all sides in these
often-protracted negotiations will be assisted by armies of lawyers whose
fees further eat away the pool of assets available to satisfy the claims of the
creditors. For small firms, the direct costs of the bankruptcy proceedings
can easily consume the entire corpus (an apt term), but they are essentially
fixed costs and hence represent only a small portion of the recoveries in the
larger cases. In the aggregate, of course, direct bankruptcy costs, even if
regarded as complete social waste, are minuscule relative to the size of the
economy.
3 
2.4 The costs of financial distress: private or social?
Small as the aggregate deadweight costs of financial distress may be, bank-
ruptcies can certainly be painful personal tragedies. Even so generally
unadmired a public figure as Donald Trump has almost become an object of
public sympathy as he struggles with his creditors for control over his garish
Taj Mahal Casino. But even if he does lose, as seemed probable at the time
of this writing, the loss will be his, not society’s. The Trump casino and
associated buildings will still be there (perhaps one should add, alas). The
only difference will be the sign on the door: Under New Management.
4
3 The deadweight costs of bankruptcy, and of financial distress more generally, may be small in
the aggregate, but they do exist. A case can be made, therefore, on standard welfare-economics
grounds for eliminating the current tax subsidy to debt implicit in our current unintegrated
corporate income tax. Achieving complete neutrality between debt and equity, however, would
require elimination of the corporate tax - a step not likely to be undertaken in the foreseeable
future.
4 Actually, according to recent press reports, Trump’s creditors have allowed him to keep
control, at least temporarily. Should he fail to meet stipulated cash-flow targets, however, the
creditors can take over his remaining interests in a so-called “pre-packaged” bankruptcy, that is,
one without formal bankruptcy proceedings (and expenses). Further use of this ingenious and
efficient method for transferring control can confidently be expected.M. H. Miller 297
The social consequences of the isolated bankruptcy can be dismissed
perhaps, but not, some would argue, bankruptcies that come in clusters.
The fear is that the bankruptcy of each overindebted firm will send a shock
wave to the firm’s equally overindebted suppliers leading in turn to more
bankruptcies until eventually the whole economy collapses in a heap. Nei-
ther economics generally nor finance in particular, however, offer much
support for this notion of a leverage-induced “bankruptcy multiplier” or a
contagion effect. Bankrupt firms, as noted earlier, do not vanish from the
earth. They often continue operating pretty much as before, though with
different ownership and possibly on a reduced scale. Even when they do
liquidate and close down, their inventory, furniture and fixtures, employees
and their customers flow to other firms elsewhere in the economy. Profit-
able investment opportunities that one failing firm passes up will be as-
sumed by others, if not always immediately, then later when the economic
climate becomes more favorable. Recent research in macro-economics sug-
gests that much of what we used to consider as output irretrievably lost in
business cycles is really only output postponed, particularly in the durable
goods industries.
To say that the human and capital resources of bankrupt firms will
eventually be reemployed, is not to deny, of course, that the personal costs
of disemployment merit consideration, particularly when they become wide-
spread. All modern economies take steps to ease the pains of transferring
human resources to other and better uses, and perhaps they should do even
more. But delaying or preventing the needed movements of resources will
also have social costs that can be even higher over the long run as the
economies of Eastern Europe are discovering.
The successive waves of bankruptcies in the early 1930’s may seem to
belie this relatively benign view of bankruptcy as a matter essentially of
private costs with no serious externalities, but not really.
5 Contrary to
widely-held folk beliefs, bankruptcies did not bring on the Great Depres-
sion. The direction of causation runs from depressions to bankruptcies, not
the other way around. The collapse of the stock market in 1929 and of the
U.S. banking system during 1931-1932 may well have created the appear-
ance of a finance-driven disaster. But that disaster was not just the inevita-
ble bursting of another overleveraged tulip bubble as some have suggested.
(Actually recent research has cast doubt on the existence of even the
original tulip bubble. But that is another story. See Garber (1989).) Respon-
sibility for turning an ordinary downturn into a depression of unprecedent-
ed severity lies primarily with the managers of the Federal Reserve System.
They failed to carry out their duties as the residual supplier of liquidity to
the public and to the banking system. The U.S. money supply imploded by
30 percent between 1930 and 1932, dragging the economy and the price
5 True externalities arise, as in the case of air pollution, only when actions by one firm increase
the costs of others. A possible analog to pollution for corporate debt might be the shifting to the
government and hence to the taxpayers, of the pension costs of failed firms. Once again,
however, the aggregate impact is of only second-order significance.298 Economic Sciences 1990
level down with it. When that happens even AAA credits get to look like
junk bonds.
That such a nightmare scenario might be repeated under present day
conditions is always possible, of course, but, until recently at least, most
economists would have dismissed it as extremely unlikely. The current
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board himself, as well as his staff, are
known to have studied the dismal episode of the early 1930’s in great depth
and to be thoroughly aware of how and why their ill-fated predecessors had
blundered. The prompt action by the Federal Reserve Board to support the
liquidity of the banking system after the stock market crash of October 19,
1987 (and again after the mini-crash of October 13, 1989) is testimony to
the lessons learned. The fear of some at the moment, however, is that both
the willingness and the ability of the Federal Reserve to maintain the
economy’s liquidity and its credit system are being undermined by regula-
tory overreaction to the S&L crisis - an overreaction that stems in part from
underestimating the market’s internal controls on overleveraging.
3.0 The Self-Correcting Tendencies in Corporate Leveraging
Just what combination of demand shifts and supply shifts triggered the big
expansion in leveraged securities in the 1980’s will eventually have to be
sorted out by future economic historians. The main point to be emphasized
here is that whether we are talking automobiles or leveraged equity or high-
yield bonds the market’s response to changes in tastes (or to changes in
production technology) is limited and self-regulating. If the producers of
any commodity expand its supply faster than the buyers want, the price will
fall and output eventually will shrink. And similarly, in the financial mar-
kets. If the public’s demand for junk bonds is overestimated by takeover
entrepreneurs, the higher interest rates they must offer to junk-bond
buyers will eat into the gains from the deals. The process of further
leveraging will slow and perhaps even be reversed.
Something very much like this endogenous slowing of leveraging could be
discerned in early 1989 even before a sequence of government initiatives
(including the criminal indictments of the leading investment bankers and
market makers in junk bonds, the forced dumping of junk-bond inventories
by beleaguered S&L’s and the stricter regulations on leveraged lending by
commercial banks) combined to undermine the liquidity of the high-yield
bond market. The issuance of high-yield bonds not only ground to a halt,
but many highly-leveraged firms moved to replace their now high-cost debts
with equity.
6
6 The process of swapping equity for debt (essentially the reverse of the parable in section 2.2
would have gone even further by now but for an unfortunate feature of U.S. tax law. Swapping
equity for debt selling at less than face value creates taxable income from “cancellation of
indebtedness.” An exception is made for firms in bankruptcy making that option more attractive
than it otherwise might be for firms whose debts are at a sizeable discount.M. H. Miller 299
3.1 Junk-bonds and the S&L crisis
To point out that the market has powerful endogenous controls against
overleveraging does not mean that who holds the highly leveraged securities
is never a matter of concern. Certainly the U.S. Savings and Loan institu-
tions should not have been using government-guaranteed savings deposits
to buy high-risk junk bonds. But to focus so much attention on the junk
bond losses of a handful of these S&L’s is to miss the main point of that
whole sorry episode. The current hue and cry over S&L junk bonds serves
merely to divert attention from those who expanded the government depos-
it guarantees and encouraged the S&L’s to make investments with higher
expected returns, but alas, also with higher risk than their traditional long-
term home mortgages.
Some, at the time, defended the enlargement of the government’s deposit
guarantee as compensation for the otherwise disabling interest rate risks
assumed by those undertaking the socially-desirable task of providing fixed
rate, long-term mortgages, Quite apart, however, from the presence even
then of alternative and less vulnerable ways of supplying mortgage money,
the deposit guarantees proved to be, as most finance specialists had predict-
ed at the time, a particularly unfortunate form of subsidy to home owner-
ship. Because the deposit guarantees gave the owners of the S&L’s what
amounted to put options against the government, they actually encouraged
the undertaking of uneconomic long-odds projects, some of which made
junk bonds look safe by comparison. The successes went to the owners; the
failures, to the insurance fund.
More is at stake, however, than merely assigning proper blame for these
failed attempts to overrule the market’s judgment that this politically pow-
erful industry was not ecnomically viable. Drawing the wrong moral from
the S&L affair can have consequences that extend far beyond the bound-
aries of this ill-fated industry. The American humorist, Mark Twain, once
remarked that a cat, having jumped on a hot stove, will never jump on a
stove again, even a cold one. Our commercial bank examiners seem to be
following precisely this pattern. Commercial banking may not quite be a
cold stove at the moment, but it is, at least, a viable industry. Unlike the
S&L’s, moreover, it plays a critical role in financing businesses, particularly,
but not only, those too small or too little known to support direct access to
the public security markets. Heavy-handed restrictions on bank loans by
examiners misreading the S&L experience will thus raise the cost of capital
to, and hence decrease the use of capital by, this important business sector.7
7 Examples of such restrictions are the guidelines, recently promulgated jointly by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve
Board governing so-called Highly Leveraged Transactions (HLT’s). These guidelines have
effectively shut off lending for corporate restructuring, whether friendly or hostile. But the
rules are so vaguely drawn and so uncertain in their application as to be inhibiting other kinds of
loans as well. Bank loans these days often carry provisions calling for automatic interest rate
increases of 100 basis points or more if the loans are later classified by the bank examiners as
HLT’s.300 Economic Sciences 1990
Whether regulatory restrictions of these and related kinds have already
gone so far as to produce a “credit crunch’ of the kind associated in the past
with monetary contraction is a subject much being argued at the moment,
but one I prefer to leave to the specialists in money and banking. My
concerns as a finance specialist are with the longer-run and less directly
visible consequences of the current anti-leverage hysteria. This hysteria has
already destroyed the liquidity of the market for high-yield bonds. The
financial futures markets, currently under heavy attack for their supposed
overleveraging are the next possible candidates for extinction, at least in
their U.S. habitats.
Many in academic finance have viewed these ill-founded attacks on our
financial markets, particularly the newer markets, with some dismay. But
they have, for the most part, stood aside from the controversies. Unlike
some of the older fields of economics, the focus in finance has not been on
issues of public policy. We have emphasized positive economics rather than
normative economics, striving for solid empirical research built on founda-
tions of simple, but powerful organizing theories. Now that our field has
officially come of age, as it were, perhaps my colleagues in finance can be
persuaded to take their noses out of their data bases from time to time and
to bring the insights of our field, and especially the public policy insights, to
the attention of a wider audience.
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